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Colonialism became the mode of universalizing the rule of 
reason during the nineteenth century. Staging territorial 
conquest as a l'civilizing missionw to enlighten the dark corners 
of the globe, to establish rationality as a principle independent 
of social status and power, Europe was forced to rely upon racist 
and colonialist hierarchies to establish the universality of 
reason. "The conquest of the earth," Joseph Conrad wrote, though 
"not a pretty thing when you look into it too much," was redeemed 
by an idea: "An idea at the back of it'; not a sentimental 
pretence,but an idea; and an unselfish belief in the idea-- 
something you can set up, and bow down before, and offer a 
sacrifice to . . . . 11 1 
To place the the selfish "conquest of the earthw as the 
double of.the ltunselfish belief in the ideaN is to situate reason 
historically; it is to position displacement as the mode of 
3 
reason's historical functioning. One does not negate the other, 
but operates in the process of its uncanny doubling. From this 
point of view, postcoloniality as a form of critique also emerges 
in this "other," colonial staging of reason, in the historical 
process of "the ideat1 alienating itself in "the conquest of the 
earth." Such a reading of postcoloniality resists both its 
celebration as freedom from imperialism and its denunciation as 
the ideological ruse of.the late-capitalist imperial ideology. 
Instead, my reading locates postcoloniality as a historically 
contingent critique that takes shape in the folds of history and 
functions through reinscriptions and revisions. 
To identify the historical location of the criticism of 
Reason, it is instructive to return to Hannah Arendt. In a neat 
reformulation of Leninls famous dictum, Arendt wrote: 
"Imperialism must be considered the first stage in political rule 
of the bourgeoisie rather than the last stage of capitalism.112 
Arendtls subtle but profound reinscription dislodges not just the 
Leninist definition but also the more common understanding of 
imperialism as an outgrowth of the West's prior self-generated 
and self -sustained capitalist revolution. For if, as Arendt 
suggests, the capitalist triumph in the metropole was achieved 
via territorial conquest elsewhere, then empire was not something 
that happened "out theren: Imperialist exploitation "outsidew 
formed part of the same process that constituted the metropolitan 
"inside.I1 This is not to abolish the.difference between 
metropolitan and colonial locations, nor is it to subsume 
imperialism in the narrative of capitalist development. On the 
contrary, it is to suggest that a contradictory relationship was 
work conjoining the core the periphery, using 
colonies to fulfill the bourgeoisiels "empty desire to have money 
beget money." To universalize free labor through enslavement, to 
extend the rule of the "invisible handw of the market through, as 
Arendt put it, a "complete disregard for all Saws--economic as 
well as ethical--w3 was to open a deep division in the 
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universalization of capital. For Arendt, this signified "an 
inner contradiction between the na$ion1s body politic and 
conquest as a political devicew that was to have profound and 
lasting effects on ~ u r o ~ e .  If imperial conquest and domination 
ensured the triumph of the metropolitan bourgeoisie at home, it 
also necessitated the alienation of the principles of liberty and 
popular representation. Compelled to rely on naked racism in 
Africa and a thoroughly authoritarian bureaucracy in India for 
its execution, the "civilizing missionw was to return home, 
Arendt suggests, to haunt Europe and plunge it into fascism. 
While bearing some resemblance to Adorno and Horkheimer's 
attribution of the Enlightenment's descent into totalitarianism 
to the functioning of its structure as a dialectical unity of 
liberation and domination15 Arendt locates the rise of fascism in 
the "inner contradictionn produced by the inextricably linked 
histories of capitalism and imperialism; for her, the 
transformation of reason's mastery over nature into totalitarian 
domination was the effect of a split opened by the process of 
capital's universalization. 
One cannot help but marvel at the acuity of Arendt's 
insights. Her identification of an "inner contradictionn 
produced in the process of Europe.'s territorial expansion 
anticipates the emphasis on disjunction and dislocation 
observable in current writings in the field of colonial and 
postcolonial studies. Without following her explicitly, recent 
analyses also foreground the intertwining of colonial and 
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metropolitan histories, and identify a deep division in the 
history of colonialism. But whereas Arendt used the notion of 
an "inner contradictionn to trace the origins of European 
totalitarianism, the concepts of displacement, doubling, and 
ambivalence seek to undo the totalizing narrative of European 
colonialism; their purpose is to show that colonial power and 
subjects were constituted and contested in the space of 
insurmountable contradictions and conflicts produced by 
colonization. The perversion of Europe's body politic that 
Arendt identified in imperialism, then, comes to signify a more 
general process of dislocation and reconstitution of colonial 
reason. In this sense, the disjunctive functioning of 
colonialism produces the possibility of postcoloniality. 
To place the current notion of disjunctive histories in 
relation to Arendt's concept of an "inner contradictionw is to 
cast postcoloniality in a different light. Postcoloniality 
acquires significance not as a term that periodizes history too 
glibly, that privileges the colonial time, that celebrates the 
contemporary period as a continuistic evolution of colonial 
slavery into postcolonial freed~m.~ Instead, it appears as a 
profoundly differentiated structure produced by the divided 
functioning of colonialism. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak defines 
postcoloniality as a case of the deconstructive philosophical 
position, as a catachresis, as an effect produced by the 
displacement of European concept-metaphors from their proper 
context. The term postcolonial, in this sense, refers to a 
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position of reinscription, and its conditions of possibility 
imply the displacement of colonial discourses in the process of 
their dissemination. To appreciate the reinscriptive and 
critical effects of the term postcolonial, however, displacement 
must not be thought of as only disarticulation or dispersal of 
colonial discourses. The concept of displacement acquires added 
vitality and specificity if it is taken to refer to not just the 
derailment of colonial categories, but their necessarily 
disjunctive, agonistic functioning. Such a concept of 
displacement begins with the proposition that a fundamental 
instability and division characterized the exercise of colonial 
power because it was required to produce the authority of the 
wcivilizedn in the figure of the wuncivilizedw; that the very 
functioning of colonial discourse entailed its estrangement 
because it was compelled to address incommensurable positions of 
the colonizer and the colonized. Thus, colonial power was 
required to relocate its categories contingently and 
contentiously as it sought to negotiate and regulate unequal 
knowledges and subjects. Seizing on the instability produced by 
this contingent and contentious regulation, fastening on the loss 
of colonialismls identity and authority necessitated by its 
historical operation, postcoloniality signifies a critical 
realignment of colonial power and knowledge. It is to evoke the 
immanent nature of its reinscriptive position that elsewhere I 
\ 
have referred to postcoloniality as an aftermath, as an after--as 
a location formed in the fragile functioning of colonialism. 8 
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Postcoloniality in this sense does not represent either the 
transendence or the reversal of colonialism, and it sidesteps the 
language of beginnings and ends. Containing a link to the 
experience of colonialism, but is not contained by it, 
postcoloniality can be thought of as a form of realignment that 
emerges in media rest undoing and redrawing colonialismls 
contingent boundaries critically. 
Such a conception of postcoloniality breaks down the 
binarism around which oppositional stances to colonialism were 
traditionally organized, and it casts doubt on notions of 
subjects and identity that underpin certain traditions of 
thinking about resistance to imperialism and domination. While 
critics consider this as the evidence of the inability of the 
concept of postcoloniality to produce a critique of contemporary 
global capitalism and imperialism, I wish to suggest otherwise. 
The concept of postcoloniality has acquired currency, it is true, 
after the defeat of socialism and third-world radicalism. But 
this does not warrant the conclusion that it is a ruse of late . 
capitalism, designed to demobilize opposition. To begin with, 
the hybrid and uncertain conditions of power and criticism 
signified by postcoloniality have a long history; an "inner 
contradictionR punctuated the exercise of colonial domination and 
characterizes current processes of capitalist globalization, 
producing different and changing forms of power. Moreover, 
oppositions to colonialism and capitalism have also always 
operated in a shifting, mobile, and disseminatory mode even when 
94 
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they have taken on the appearance of being grounded in pure, 
stable, and solid identities. The issue, therefore, is not 
whether disjunction and displacement demobilize the oppposition 
to power, but. how and in what historically contingent ways the 
disjunctive and differentiating functioning of colonial and 
capitalist dominance provides sources for an immanent criticism, 
for conducting a sort of guerilla warfare that operates through 
historically specific strategies of recombination and 
realignment. It is precisely such a mode of functioning of 
power and criticism that emerges from the history colonial 
conquest and capitalist expansion, and it is this that I wish to 
highlight in this essay. 
Colonialism and the Metropolitan Liberal Discourse 
No sooner had the East India Company acquired territorial 
power in India than its conduct was subjected to a blistering 
attack. I refer here, of course, to Edmund Burke's impassioned 
denunciation of Warren Hastings, the Governor-General of the 
Company in the late eighteenth century. Hastings believed firmly 
that the Company ought to respect India's oriental laws and 
customs, but this belief did not prevent him from imprisoning and 
displacing Indian chieftains, and annexing their territories. 
Burke's fury at Hastings's role in acquiring territory derived 
its force from the recognition that colonial oppression in India 
would return to corrupt the English body politic. 
Do we not know that there are many men who wait, and 
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who indeed hardly wait, the event of this prosecution, 
to let loose all the 'corrupt wealth of India, acquired 
by the oppression of that country, for the corruption 
of all the liberties of this, and to fill the 
Parliament with men who are now the object of its 
indignation?--To-day the Commons of Great Britain 
prosecute the delinquents of India.--To-morrow the 
delinquents of India may be the Commons of Great 
Britain. 9 
Despite Burke's eloquent rage, Hastings was to be acquitted by 
, 
the House of Lords, overturning his impeachment by the Commons. 
This decision closed the small window that Burke's blistering 
attack had opened to bring into view the incompatibility between 
the Company's declared aim to preserve traditions and colonial 
expansion. This is neither surprising, nor only a reflection of 
the support that Hastings enjoyed in the House of Lords. Both 
Burke and Hastings, the,accuser and the accused, shared the guilt 
of colonial rule. The English authority over the indigenous 
population was not in question, and both even agreed that 
indigenous customs and laws should guide Company rule in India. 
Colonization itself was not.on trial but the stage for a 
discursive contest between the Company and the Parliament, 
between the merchant and the state, to fashion an appropriate 
language of colonial appropriation. With the contest framed to 
bring under control the "arbitrary powerw of the merchant, the 
arbitrariness of colonization itself was placed beyond scrutiny, 
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and all the blame was personified in Hastings. Burke seized on 
Hastings because, as Sara Suleri points out, "he was unable to 
admit that his vision of colonial rapacity could never resolve 
itself into a myth of imperial venerability." lo BY singling out 
Hastings as the "repository of ill-doing," however, Burke 
protected "the colonial project from being indicted for the 
larger ill of which Hastings was simply a herald." l1 With the 
arbitrariness of colonization itself expunged from the 
proceedings, the trial became a spectacle about powerful 
individuals. Though Burke was defeated, but the accountability 
he wanted was successfully instituted. The Parliament gradually 
enlarged its control over the affairs of the Company, and 
colonialism entered the fiber of British life, just as Burke had 
feared. 
But the colony entered not just in the form of the much- 
caricatured "nabobsw who returned from India with their ill- 
gotten wealth to set themselves up as gentlemen, acquire large 
estates and lordships, and buy parliamentary seats. It surfaced 
in British liberalism itself, including in Utilitarian high 
priests, Jeremy Bentham, and two famous employees of the Company, 
James Mill and John Stuart Mill. While India came to offer an 
ideal location for realizing Bentham's vision of the Panapticon 
and prison discipline, James Mill's contempt for India's culture 
and civilization opened a vast territory where liberalism could 
be cast in the authoritarian mold at will and with leisure. 12 
The most revealing but little-recognized effect that 
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colonialism produced in liberal ideology can be found, however, 
in John Stuart Mill. Consider, for example, his attempt to 
reconcile the confident assertion that Britain was committed to 
the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other nations 
with the British annexation of Awadh in 1856. Mill begins his 
essay with an unambiguous declaration of Britain's adherence to 
the principle of non-intervention: "There is a country in Europe, 
equal to the greatest in extent of dominion, far exceeding any 
other in wealth, and in the power that wealth bestows, the 
declared principle of whose foreign policy is, to let other 
nations alone. "I3 But he must reconcile this declaration with 
the British annexation of Awadh, violating an existing treaty 
between the East India Company and the ruler of the province. 
Mill seeks to accomplish this by repeating the excuse that the 
Company had used, namely, that the ruler had violated the terms 
of the treaty by allowing his reign to become a "mixture of 
tyranny and anarchy. "I4 The intervention, theref ore, was 
justified because it ended, an oppression for which England was 
morally accountable. Elaborated here is the idea of the 
''civilizing mission,11 the pursuit of which requires violation of 
the declared principle of Britain's foreign policy. Observable 
here is an irresolvable paradox in the enunciation of the 
liberal discourse in the colonies: The extension of the 
,principles of liberty to other territories required their 
estrangement in despotism. Thus, Mill had to claim that the 
universal principle oE non-interference did not apply to the 
British in India or the French in Algeria. He argued that "it 
... 
was a grave errorw to assume that "the same rules of 
international moralityn that obtained between civilized nations 
could apply to relations between the "civilized nation and 
barbarians.f115 The llbarbariansw could not follow the principle 
of reciprocity expected of "civilized nationsw because they could 
not' be "depended on for observing any rules.nn What is noticeable 
here is the fact that the appeal to colonial difference 
authorizes the idea of "civilized nations;" the claims of 
civilization come to rest on the 'deficiency of barbarism. 
"Independence and nationalityw emerge as essential for "the 
growth and development of a peoplew precisely when they are shown 
to be "either a certain evil, or at best a questionable goodw for 
the uncivilized. l6 In this institution of authority, the 
barabarian emerges as the displaced representation of the 
civilized: Europe is split and authorized by its barbaric double. 
To constitute the authority of the civilized at its limits, 
however, was to render it liminal;.to summon the colonial 
nlsupplement" to authorize the colonizers was to open the 
discourse to its displacement by those "barbariansn who neither 
knew the rules of reciprocity nor valued independence and 
nationality .I7 The effect of the supplement was to alienate the 
discourse, forcing Mill to disavow the very principle of non- 
.interference he wished to defend and embrace authoritarianism. 
"The Romans were not the most cleanhanded of conquerors, yet 
would it have been better for Gaul and spain, Numidia and Dacia, 
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never to have formed part of the Roman ~ m ~ i r e l ~ l *  
Utilitarianism, elaborated and tested in colonial governance 
cast British liberalism in a decidedly authoritarian mold, 
persuading it that not only could good government substitute for 
representative government in the colonies, but.also that despotic 
rule alone could institute the rule of law and order overseas. 19 
Having thus elaborated the rule of law and the principle of good 
government in the colonies, Utilitarianism practiced the conceit 
that the verities of liberal ideology were universal, and that 
its history lay securely within the boundaries of the English 
nation--a conceit that survives in numerous studies of British 
liberalism that determinedly overlook its colonial genealogy. 
This pretense enabled the metropolitan discourse to stretch 
itself to cover the colonies but cover over the effects of its 
extension. Britain's glory came to be embodied in its vast 
empire stretching from the Caribbean islands to India, and ' 
displayed in artifacts from these territories at grand 
international exhibitions, and yet it was believed to be somehow 
insulated from the effects of the sordid business of conquests 
and profiteering. Colonial possessions became jewels in the 
British crown, but they were thought to be merely decorative. 
Thus, Disraeli could mastermind the coronation of Queen 
Victoria as the Empress of India in 1877 as a domestic political 
maneuver because the empire was already domesticated as something 
"out there," outside Britain and to be shared by all Britons. 
Formed in the alliance between capitalism, colonialism, and 
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liberal ideology, the metropolitan discourse was blind to the 
incompatibility between the "nation's body politic and conquest 
as a political device." Is it any wonder, then, that when 
Britain entered the ''scramble for Africaw in the 1880s, Gladstone 
felt drawn into it unwillingly, by force of circumstance? So 
integral had the colonial calculus become in the political 
arithmetic of the British imperial nation-state that, beginning 
with the conquest of Egypt in 1882, it was driven to participate 
in the partition of Africa without overwhelming economic 
interests, as imperial historians remind us persistently. 20 
If economics did not determine politics in the outbreak of 
the "new imperiali~m,~ this should not cause any surprise. After 
all, political conquests had prepared for capitalism's world-wide 
expansion from the very beginning. The late nineteenth-century 
imperialist scramble for Africa completed a process started in 
the early 1500s, and was distinguished by the fact that the 
global spread of capitalism had come to depend on imperial 
nation-states, not on conquistadores and trading monopolies, but 
on the giddy onrush of jingoism among the metropolitan masses and 
the practice of realpolitik by imperial politicians. This world 
of imperial nation-states advanced the spread of "free laborw by 
unleashing racist oppression and extra-economic coercion. The 
structural split between the ideals of liberty and their 
alienation in the colonies was there to see, but metropolitan 
intellectuals looked away. Thus, Joseph Conrad's Heart of 
Darkness brilliantly demonstrated that the artless truth of 
Europe was uttered in its artful lie in the colonies. But even 
as Conrad showed that the savagery Europe committed in the heart 
of Africa had returned to haunt its soul, he chose to see 
Africans as mute victims and silent onlookers of the European 
descent into the depths of barbarism. Kurtz, on the other hand, 
was celebrated as a modernist hero for "staring into an abyss of 
nihilism so total that the issues of imperialism and racism 
paleldl into insignificance. w21 Conrad stared into Europe s 
heart of darkness, but could not locate other sources of 
knowledge and agency that drove Europeans into colonial savagery. 
Or take George Orwell, who confessed that his mind was split 
working as a colonial officer in Burma: "All I knew was that I 
was stuck between my hatred for the empire I served and my rage 
against the evil-spirited little beasts who tried to make my job 
impossible. v'22 With one part of his mind, he knew "the British 
raj to be an unbreakable tyrannytl' with another he thought the 
"greatest joy in the world would be to.drive a bayonet into a 
~uddhist priest's guts." This split thought, Orwell, continues, 
was the normal by-product of imperialism experienced by colonial 
officials, but one that they would confess to only when caught 
"off duty." 
But the colonial official's work was never done, and the 
luxury of "off dutyw contemplation was postponed. This is not 
surprising, for though split minds and double visions pointed to 
a fundamental division and instability in colonialism, they also 
constituted the space of its enunciation: British rule operated 
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by splitting between the empire's "unbreakable tyrannyw and 
"evil-spirited little beastsn of Burma. In shuttling between 
between the two, the colonizer could experience a loss of agency 
and feel helpless, as Orwell did, but this experience was yet to 
serve as.an argument for dismantling the colonial divide. Europe 
had to endure the slaughter of millions in two world wars, 
undergo the terrible experience of colonial oppression coming 
home to the European soil with the ferocious rage of the return 
of the repressed, and confront the upsurge of anti-colonial 
movements before it could reflect on the implications of the 
incompatibility of empire and nation, or what Hannah Arendt 
called ''the inner contradiction between the nation's body politic 
and conquest as a political device." 
F r o m  C o l o n i e s  to the T h i r d  World 
In the colonies, on the other hand, where Europe's body 
politic was experienced as the political device of conquest, the 
incompatibility was all too clear, and was brought to light by 
slave rebellions, peasant revolts, and popular uprisings. While 
the insurgency of subaltern groups marked the limits of the 
liberal discourse, even colonized intellectuals with access to 
the culture of the colonizers came around to recognizing its deep 
fissure when they found that the "civilizing missionn came 
encased in steel armor. No one was perhaps more eloquent in this 
respect than Frantz Fanon whose ''striptease of our humanismtU as 
Jean-Paul Sartre put it,23 laid bare the contradiction entailed 
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in the application of the Rights of Man to the colonies. "That 
same Europe where they were never done talking of Man, and where 
they never stopped proclaiming that they were only anxious for 
the welfare of Man: today we know with what sufferings humanity 
has paid for every one of their triumphs. 
But there was more to the alienation of liberal ideals in 
the colonies than its visibility. If subaltern resistance and 
critiques by the colonized exposed the limits of the liberal 
discourse, they also forced it into liminality. The fact that 
the liberal discourse was instituted through illiberal 
instruments meant that it was forced to lose its identity and 
authority in the very process of its operation. This loss, this 
leakage of liberalism into despotism, turning limits of the 
discourse into conditions of liminality, rendered colonial power 
both unstable and productive. Unstable because, forced to 
negotiate the gap between liberal ideals and their alienation, 
colonial power could not but dislodge its subjects; the "native" 
could not be identified simply or located unproblematically when 
colonial power itself was compelled to dislocate, when there was 
no fixed position from which the colonized could be constituted. 
The "nation's body politi~,~~ let us remember, was forced to 
support "conquest as a political device;" the "rules between 
civilized nations," we know, were underpinned by the barbaric 
Msupplement.m Because of these necessary dislocations, an 
endemic instability and movement characterized the functioning of 
colonial power. For the same reason, however, it was also 
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effective in producing a wide range of positions that the 
"nativett was obliged to occupy. Now race and then gender, now 
biology and then culture, now class and then ethnicity, or any 
combination of these was invoked, depending on the context. The 
extraordinary variety in colonialism, which remained at the same 
time and everywhere an exercise of alien power, testifies to the 
productivity of displacement. Once we appreciate this nature of 
colonial power, the alienation of ideals in the colonies acquires 
a highly charged shape; it becomes more than a simple 
demonstration of the European double-speak, and emerges as the 
mode of dissemination of colonial discourse. 
What was disseminated most widely in the colonies was the 
nation-state. Paralleling the emergence of the imperial nation- 
state form in metropolitan locations, projects to create anti- 
colonial nation-states flourished in the colonies. And though 
each anti-colonial and imperial nationalism claimed uniqueness 
and primordiality, the division between empire and nation left a 
profound imprint on the nationalist structuring of the world. 
This meant that even if capitalism underwrote the global 
integration of territories, the conflictual economy of empire and 
nation overwrote its functioning. Thus, every internationalist 
project was forced to negotiate the interstitial space between 
capital and race, every expression of universal sisterhood or 
working-class solidarity had to confront the heterogeneity of the 
metropolitan and colonial subalterns. More frequently than not, 
such universalist expressions were unable to radically 
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reconfigure the relationship between empire and nation, and 
proceeded no further than imperial feminism, produced no greater 
vision than the nationalist opportunism of the Second 
International, and formulated no larger project of revolutionary 
transformation than msocialism in one country." 
A similar process also occurred in the colonies where 
nationalist movements were able to rearticulate the divided 
enunciation of the colonial discourse to project the nation-state 
as the arena for the resolution of class, caste, gender, and 
ethnic questions. Enjoying access to the culture of Europe but 
deeply aware of its limits in the colonies, the nationalist 
intelligentsia was able to resituate it, cross-hatching it with 
notions of tradition, history, culture, and justice. It 
incorporated modern science and polity in the anti-colonial 
agenda but represented them as the return of the indigenous and 
the archaic; it endorsed womenls education and the reform of 
patriarchy but located them in the project to recover the nation; 
it declared solidarity with subaltern struggles against agrarian 
and industrial transformations but turned them into mobilizations 
for the achievement of a nation-state. 
In this respect, Partha Chatterjee's characterization of 
Indian nationalism as a "passive revolutionw is appropriate and 
instructive. 25 Chatterjee suggests that while Indian 
nationalists were able to fabricate a finely-textured cultural 
vision of the uncolonized nation, their conception remained an 
elite af f &r, and too closely determined by Enlightenment ideals 
and capitalist goals to appeal broadly. Gandhigs arrival marked 
an important watershed, for he offered a non-modernist agenda 
that could both accommodate and appropriate the anti-capitalist 
and anti-Enlightenment politics of the peasantry. For Indian 
nationalists, the beauty of the Gandhian intervention lay in the 
fact that it could deliver the popular forces without ceding them 
.the initiative. Thus, Nehru conceded that Gandhi had the uncanny 
ability to read the pulse of the "irrationalm peasants, but, 
brushing aside Gandhils reservations on modern industry and 
politics, he went ahead with the program of building a modern 
nation-state. Even Nehru could not. ignore the necessity of 
imagining the characteristically Indian basis for his modernizing 
program. His Discoverv of India (1946) contains a moving "questw 
to locate the irreducible difference of the Indian nation, which 
he found-in the'idea of cultural synthesis. Placing himself as 
an interpreter who could identify a rational idea of India hidden 
in the mystical slogans of "Mother Indian raised by the masses, 
Nehru found the nation woven into the psychic and cultural lives 
of the people. 26 In Nehrugs vision, the modern Indian state was 
to represent the myth-ridden people whose welfare and 
transformation, he acknowledged, could not be left to the 
unrestrained play of capitalism but had to be carefully nurtured 
by a state-regulated "mixed economy." Though a far cry from 
Gandhils nonmodern utopia, Nehruls "mixed economyN was an 
eloquent reatriculation of the liberal discourse; it fastened on 
the dislocation of the liberal discourse to forge a vision at 
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once different from both colonial modernity and Gandhils 
nonmodern utopia. 
Indian nationalists were not alone in their longing for a 
deep tradition, history, and uncolonized culture, and in their 
search for a more just, egalitarian, and prosperous future. 
Throughout the colonial world, nationalist movements sought to 
find another basis for the modern nation. Nkrumahls African 
socialism, Kenyattals I8Mount Kenya," and Sukarnols combined 
appeal to nationalism and social revolution were some of the many 
ways in which the nationalists reinscribed imperial texts. 
Seizing on the ambivalent articulation of the metropolitan 
discourse, they re-imagined or hybridized the wmodularw imagined 
community. Drawing on popular struggles, but appropriating their 
anti-capitalist energies and subaltern languages, nationalist 
movements succeeded as "passive revolutions," To be sure, each 
passive revolution was different and represented a distinct 
political and ideological configuration. Common to all of them, 
however, was the fact that they functioned in the gap opened in 
the liberal discoursels colonial functioning, 
As the wave of decolonization spread across Asia and Africa 
during the 1950s and the 1960s, the nationalists projected modern 
nation-states as agents for healing the hidden injuries of social 
oppression and cultural uprooting. However limited their 
hegemony, however coercively secured their dominance, the newly- 
independent regimes could rearticulate the liberal discourse to 
invoke emancipatory meanings. This was difficult and short- 
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lived, but rendered possible by the uncertain status and 
functioning of the liberal discourse, by the fact that its 
enunciation in third-world locations required it to shift 
registers, be mobile and flexible, in order to produce 
authoritative meanings. Shifting this uncertain discourse 
radically, anti-colonial nationalists reconfigured the post-war 
tripartite division of the world to assemble a third-worldist 
conception from memories of colonial exploitation and desires for 
cultural regeneration. Richard Wright captured something of the 
irresistible power of the urge for social justice and cultural 
renewal that ex-colonial African and Asian nation-states 
marshalled at the Bandung conference in 1955: 
It was the kind of meeting that no anthropologist, no 
sociologist, no political scientist would ever have 
dreamed of staging; it was too simple, too elementary, 
cutting through outer layers of disparate social and 
political and cultural facts down to the bare brute 
residues of human existence: races and religions and 
continents. Only brown, black, and yellow men who had 
long been made agonizingly self-conscious, under the 
rigors of colonial rule, of their race and their 
religion could have felt the need for such a meeting. 
There was something extra-political, extra-social, 
almost extra-human about it. 27 
Indeed, there was something utopian, something "extra- 
political, extra-social, almost extra-human," about this effort 
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to make the experience of colonial domination the basis for a 
postcolonial transformation. Fanon1s notion of a revolutionary 
national culture shared something of Wright's sense of the 
"extra-human,? for he, too, envisioned that only the exertion of 
sheer will would produce a radical national culture of 
decolonization. He, too, thought of the revolution of the 
colonized as one that "no anthropologist, no sociologist, no 
political scientist would ever have dreamed of staging." Marxism 
needed to be stretched, as Fanon put it, to understand colonial 
realities and imagine postcolonial futures. ** Enthralled as 
Wright and Fanon were with the possibility of a third way, they 
were also deeply.conscious of how difficult it was to realize. 
Wright warned that it was "not difficult to imagine Moslems, 
Hindus, Buddhists, and Shintoists launching vast crusades, armed 
with modern weapons to make the world safe for their mystical 
notions. lt2' Fanon worried that the national bourgeoisie would 
crush the will of a revolutionary national culture. 
In the end, the hope for a revolutionary "third wayw was 
crushed. As the euphoria of the immediate postindependence 
period wore off, third-world states became consumed by the 
project to "catch upw with the West; most of Africa fell to 
dictatorships and military regimes; radical regimes were 
subjected to enormous pressures by the US; and neocolonialism 
.subordinated the economies of the new nations to the global 
capitalist system. The inescapable conclusion was that the 
indigenization of the nation-state form had failed to impede 
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imperialism; that the nationalist or "third-worldistw 
reformulation of the liberal discourse had fallen prey to the 
advancing global capitalist integration of the world. 
Global Integration and Postcolonial Critiques 
The dependency theory captured some of the key features in 
the subordination of non-European territories, pointing out that 
developmentalism and modernization programs imposed on, or 
willingly adopted by, former colonies were responsible for the 
"development of underdevelopment." Exploding the pretensions of 
nationalist regimes, the dependency theory brought to the surface 
the corrosive impact of global capitalism on the social and 
economic fiber of ex-colonial territories. Is it any wonder, 
then, that the dependency theory was followed quickly by Immanuel 
Wallersteints world-system theory? Directed to show that a .  
single capitalist world-system has been in the making since the 
sixteenth century, the world-system theory marked the end of the 
three-world conception. Additional studies have poured in to 
provide further substantiation of the single-world thesis. These 
studies demonstrate that global integration under capitalism has 
achieved an unprecedented level in the contemporary period. 
Multinational corporations have become enormously powerful and 
truly global, and the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe has opened fresh territories for the spread of 
capital. Massive movements of capital and migrants have turned 
some areas into "emerging marketsm while marginalizing others 
into "basket cases." The structure of flexible sourcing and 
markets has scrambled older divisions, producing "third-worldn 
enclaves in Los Angeles and New York, generating "first-worldw 
capitalist wmiraclesw in East Asia. As the internationalization 
of capital after the collapse of the Soviet Union produces a new, 
post-nation-state organization of class structures, advancing the 
process of dismantling the Fordist combination of big capital-big 
labor-big government in favor of flexible acc~mulation, 30 it also 
seeks to turn international organizations and nation-states into 
capital-servicing units. 
The unprecedented advance in the internationalization of 
capital, however, should be examined carefully for its political 
implications. By now we should be accustomed to apocalyptic 
visions announcing the end of the world as we have known it. 
Critics have frequently proclaimed the arrival of the Itlast 
stagen in the development of capitalism, its final "general 
crisis," its spread to every corner of the globe. This is not to 
contest the thesis of an unprecedented global integration, but to 
raise a note of caution about the finalist scenarios it provokes. 
Skepticism is all the more important because announcements of the 
ultimate capitalist homogenization of the globe either defuses 
criticism or postpones it to the time of the future catastrophe. 
It is with this note of caution, then, that we should approach 
critics such as Arif Dirlik and Aijaz Ahmad who direct plenty of 
polemical fire and self-righteous rhetoric at postcolonial 
criticism but, in their zeal to represent themselves as the last 
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anti-capitalist intellectuals, affirm that capital can breathe a 
"puren life. In their writings, the universalization of capital 
.is assumed to be such an accomplished fact that anything other 
than a labor-capital conflict becomes a diversion, an 
epiphenomenon of capitalism itself. It is thus that postcolonial 
criticism comes in for a sharp rebuke for refusing to make labor- 
capital conflicts its founding principle. But such transparent 
posturing for the position of critical intellectuals ignores 
capital's hybridized life. 
Hybridity is not offered here as resistance to capitalism, 
and not as iouissance that resists the homogeneity of capital, 
but as capital's aporetic and ambivalent articulation with alien 
structures that is at once regulative in its effects and unstable 
in its operation. Perhaps it is necessary to remember.that Marx 
himself had argued that the universalization of capital requires 
difference; it spreads only by reconstituting otherness. The 
history of capital's expansion through racist slavery, colonial 
exploitation, peasant production, and ethnic and gendered 
mobilization of labor, should remind us that its universalization 
entailed its alienation into other structures: Capital achieved 
its dominance by operating in alien structures. This meant that 
even as capital appropriated other structures, this appropriation 
was expressed in the transformation and functioning of these 
alien forms. 
To recognize that hybridization does not mean resistance to 
capital's expansion but constitutes its ambivalent and uncertain 
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mode of expansion is to acknowledge that globalization is a 
differentiated and differentiating structure. It operates in 
unevenness, and it proceeds by domesticating difference. Even as 
three worlds collapse into -one, this process does not mean 
erosion of difference but its rearticulation. Thus, as 
capitalism expands, it expresses itself in ever-changing forms, 
inhabiting pre- and non-capitalist forms, domesticating and 
subordinating them, performing "capitalist miraclestt in non- 
European territories and attributing them to "differenttt cultural 
values. To be sure, these values--order, discipline, and thrift- 
-look very much like values of the modern West. But this act of 
misrepresentation demonstrates the pivotal role of difference in 
advancing capitalist values. Clearly, the internationalization 
of capital proceeds through these instances of differentiation, 
and produces new global forms of unevenness, inequality, 
difference, and discrimination. The very same process, however, 
also renders capitalism open to subaltern pressures, to the 
pressure exerted by forms and forces it subordinates. 
So, even as we recognize that three worlds have collapsed 
into a single differentiated structure, the demand for immanent 
criticism remains relevant. For, arising in the folds of 
history, in its disjunctive moments and displaced locations, 
immanent criticism functions to refigure it. Edward Said's 
Orientalism (1978) can be read as an example of such a criticism. 
Recognizing that Orientalismts authority was global, that it 
enlisted powerful institutions in the "Orientu itself in 
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exercising power, Said distanced himself from third-world 
nationalism while situating his critique from the vantage-point 
of the other. It is true that his identification of the liberal- 
humanist intellectual as the critic of Orientalist knowledge 
partially undermined the scope of his criticism, but there is 
little doubt that his book's persistent violation of boundaries 
has had an insurgent effect. It is not necessary here to offer a 
survey of writings classed under the postcolonial label, except 
to state that they also, to put it in Spivakls terms, Itinhabit a 
structure that they critique." This, in itself, is not 
extraordinary. As I have argued, anti-colonial nationalism and 
third-world revolutionary programs also took shape in the folds 
of the liberal discourse as it was forced to alienate itself. 
But whereas previous efforts were certain of binarism in their 
construction of a militant oppositionality, postcolonial 
criticism locates oppositionality in ways that do not cohere 
around familiar and stable lines of demarcation, 
It is all too easy to read split sources of agency and 
hybrid locations of social identification only in terms of 
poststructuralismls influence, as a hermeneutic commitment to 
anti-essentialist epistemology, as a reflection of postmodern 
decentering and pastiche. It is more useful, however, to view 
the stress on doubling, deconstruction, disjunction, dialogism, 
etc., as an attempt to respond to a situation in which historical 
developments have deeply compromised some of the old truths or 
rendered them irrelevant. We are witness to a profound corrosion 
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in the authority of established forms of politics and knowledge. 
This is reflected in the urge to find more 81groundedm forms of 
politics. The emergence of identity politics, and the eruption 
of conflicts and crises provoked by efforts to ethnicize nation- 
states and citizenship are some of the expressions of the search 
for more located sources of politics. The urge to find stable 
and pure locations for political intervention is widespread, and 
it includes calls to resurrect labor/capital and First 
WorldlThird World oppositions. But, as the Enlightenment project 
of building a rational, ordered society offers the choice, as it 
does in India now, between the secularism of state-regulated 
identities, on the one hand, and the majoritarianism of the 
religious Right, on the other, we clearly need to think through 
and beyond established forms of politics and knowledge. When 
categories such as the nation-state and the third world have been 
squeezed dry of nearly all their emancipatory potential, then the 
urge to fashion a strategic response to the prevailing 
configuration of knowledge and power requires that we think along 
differentiated, interpellated, mobile, and unsettling lines..The 
call, instead, to organize all critiques along stable lines of 
the labor-capital conflict fails to address the strategic 
necessities of a situation wherein the alienating functioning of 
capitalism and the liberal discourse have produced new subaltern 
positions, displacing previous oppositions ever more radically. 
Even as we recognize that the conceptual/political specification 
of postcolonial criticism has yet to achieve adequate complexity 
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and clarity, it is necessary to acknowledge that critical work 
can hardly be accomplished by reinstating binarisms, or by making 
psychologically comforting appeals to bring back capitalism and 
class into our analysis without seriously rethinking and 
reformulating what these concepts might mean when viewed in their 
disseminatory, disjunctive functioning. The same can be said of 
attempts to resurrect the concept of the third world, to situate 
intellectuals Itwho live and workt1 outside the'metropole as more 
located critics of contemporary power. For these evoke Wright's 
sense of the "extra-human1@ at a time when its revolutionary 
impulse has been thoroughly corroded and compromised, and can 
serve as nativist responses of elite intellectuals whose power to 
represent their nations is threatened by globalization. The issue 
of the location of criticism, to be sure, is of utmost 
importance, for the current financialization of the globe 
reterritorializes the world unevenly, producing new forms of 
dominance and subalternity. All the more reason that the issue 
of the location of criticism has to be conceived more flexibly. 
This conception cannot afford to blindly reiterate older 
oppositional grounds in the name of grounding itself 
historically, but must remain alive to possibilities of critique 
in the disjunctive, differential functioning of power. 
The post of postcolonial criticism, then, is not a problem 
of "postiesfW not a result of an epistemological commitment to 
anti-essentialism, but a response to a strategic situation of 
contemporary globalization and differentiation. Obviously 
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related to contemporary intellectual trends and theories of 
poststructuralism and postmodernism, it is not reducible to them. 
It signifies an attempt to rethink, transform, relocate, or 
reclaim, as Spivak remarks, "concept metaphors for which no 
historically adequate referent may be advanced from the 
postcolonial space." Based on the belief that we do not have the 
option of saying no to the determinate conditions of history-- 
capitalist modernity, discourses of liberty, citizenship, 
individual rights, nation-state--postcolonial criticism attempts 
to identify, in the displaced historical functioning of these 
discourses, the basis for other articulations. Pointing to the 
force of uncertainty produced by the historical conjoining of 
empire and nation, of capital and race, of globalization and 
difference, it directs attention to those relocations of dominant 
discourses that emerge from elsewhere--not from the space of the 
nation-state, not from the third-world space, but from 
contingent, contentious, and heterogenous subaltern positions. 
NOTES 
1. Heart of .Darkness Robert Kimbrough ed. (New York: W. W. 
Norton, 1988), 10. 
The Oriains of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1951), 138. 
3. Arendt, 137. 
4. Arendt, 128. 
5. M. Horkheimer and T. Adorno, Dialectic of Enliahtenment 
trans. J. Cumming (New York: Herder & Herder, 1972), Chs. I& 
2. 
6. For some recent criticisms along these lines, see Arif 
Dirlik, The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the 
Age of Global Capitalism," Critical, 20 (Winter 
1994), 328-356; Aijaz Ahmad, @#The Politics of Literary 
Post~oloniality,~~ Pace and Class, 36:3 (1995), 1-20. From a 
somewhat different point of view and with less polemical 
heat, this criticism is also made by Anne McClintock, 
Jm~erial Leather: Race. 'Gender and Sexualitv - in the Colonial, 
Context (London: Routledge, 1995) . For a thoughtful 
critique of these these authors and their arguments, see 
Stuart Hall, When was the 'post-colonial8? Thinking at the 
limit," in The Post-Colonial Ouestion: Common Skies. Divided 
Porizins Iain Chambers and Lidia Curti ed. (London and New 
York, Routledge, 1996), 242-60. 
Prakash/32 
Outside in the Teachina Machine (London: Routledge, 1993), 
281. 
"Introduction: After colonial ism,^ in After Colonialism: 
Zm~erial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements ed. Gyan 
Prakash (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 4. 
The Works of Edmund Burke (Boston: Charles C, Little and 
James Brown, 1839), Vol. 7, 519. 
Sara Suleri, The Rhetoric of Enalish India (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1992), 45. 
Suleri, 45, 
Eric T. Stokes cites Bentham noting with satisfaction that 
James Mill was "a sincere trumpeteer of Panapticon." Stokes 
also writes that "the prisons constructed at Poona and 
Ratnagiri, together with the introduction of an improved 
system of prison discipline, were symbolic of the new 
current of ideas which the Utilitarians were directing upon 
Indian administration.It See his The Enalish Utilitarians and 
India (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959; rpt. Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), 149-50, James Mill's monumental 
T h e a  (1817) was an elaborate 
exercise in authorizing the authoritarianism of liberal 
imperialism. 
John Stuart Mill, "A Few Words on.Non-Intervention," 
Dissertations and Discussions (London: Longmans, Green, 




On the effect of the colonial supplement on John Stuart 
Mill's discourse, see Homi Bhabha, m e  Location of Culture 
(London: Routledge, 1994), 93-101. 
Mill, 168. 
Writing of John Stuart Mill's essay On Libertv, Eric'~. 
Stokes states: "He was faithful to his-father [James Mill] 
in holding to the belief that India could still be governed 
only despotically." Stokes, 298. In general, although 
Stokes does not provide quite the same interpretation as I 
have offered, he comes quite close to it. Consider the 
following. The "authoritarian element in utilitarianismtm 
writes Stokes, I1which had found in India so much more 
congenial a field for its development and which was given a 
working expression in the machine of the Indian bureaucracy, 
was carried back into the English thought and helped to 
produce the crisis within English liberalism which occurred 
in 1886." 289. 
Ronald Robinson & John Gallaghar, with Alice Denny, Africa 
and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Im~erialism (New 
York: Doubleday, 1961) 
Patrick Brantlinger, Rule of Darkness: British Literature 
and Im~erialism. 1830-1914 (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press, 1988) , 270. 
George Orwell, "Shooting an Elephant," in A Collection of 
Prakash/34 
Essavs (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), 149. I 
have learned much from Ranajit Guhals brilliant reading of 
this text. See his "Not at Home in Empire," Critical Inquiry 
(forthcoming) , 
23. Jean Paul Sartre, "PrefaceIt1 in Frantz Fanon, The Wrtetched 
of (New York: Grove Weidenfield, 1991), 24. 
24. Fanon, 312. 
25. Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thouuht and the Colonial 
World: A Derivative Discourse? (London: Zed Press, 1986). 
26. Nehru wrote: "Sometimes as I reached a gathering, a great 
roar of welcome would greet me: Bharat Mata ki Jai--Victory 
to Mother India! I would ask them unexpectedly what they 
meant by that cry, who was this Bharat Mata, the Mother 
India, whose victory they wanted? My question would amuse 
them and surprise them, and then, not knowing exactly what 
to answer, they would look at each other and at me,..At last 
a vigorous Jat, wedded.to the soil from immemorial 
generations, would say that it was the dharti, the good 
earth of India, that they meant, What earth? Their 
particular village patch, or all the patches in the district 
or province, or in the whole of India?" Nehru then goes on 
to offer his own interpretation of what India meant and what 
the slogans meant. He would explain that "India was all this 
that they had thought, but it was much more." Mountains, 
forests, fields. "pharat Mata, Mother India was essentially 
these millions of people, and victory meant victory to.these 
Prakashl35 
people. You are parts of this Bharat Mata, I told them, you 
are in a manner yourselves Bharat Mata." The Discoverv of 
India (New York, Doubleday, 1946), 29. 
27. Richard Wright, The Color Curtain (Cleveland and New York: 
The World Publishing Company, 1956), 13-14. 
28. Fanon, 40. 
29. Wright, 214. 
30. See David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernitv: An Enauirv 
into the Oriains of Cultural Chanae (Oxford and Cambridge, 
MA: Basil Blackwell, 1989) on this transition of capitalism.. 

